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This research paper brings forward a non-standard convertible zero-coupon bond 
endowed with a set of distinctive features attached to it so as to strengthen the 
corporate governance of the issuer, namely that conversion actually takes place at 
maturity  date  only;  that  conversion  is  mandatory;  it  offers  investors  a  pay-off 
function tailored to match the conversion; there is no call provision whatsoever; it is 
suitable for private or public placements; credit-risk rating is of the essence and, 
lastly, it requires from the company a track record statement on behalf of investors. 
Although this sort of bond actually provides the company with a powerful financing 
vehicle,  we  argue  that  it  could  also  play  a  constructive  role  if  it  were  used  in 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the early 80s, some investment banks offered trust funds by which investors
1 
could buy securities that were equivalent to zero-coupon bonds
2. Such financials 
actually relied on Treasury Notes and Treasury Bonds bought beforehand in bulk, 
which were next sold like claims to single coupons of interest with a determined 
maturity,  or  single  principals  at  their  contractual  maturity.  They  were  the 
forerunners of what shortly after would be known as Treasury Strips. 
 
It was in 1985 that the Treasury set up a market for investors to purchase directly 
coupons  of  interest  and  principal,  instead  of  proxies  of  them
3.  The  market  for 
Strips (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities) was 
born and strove for greater efficiency at an astonishing pace.  
 
Among  the  consequences  springing  out  of  this  technological  achievement,  we 
point to the following ones: 
 
a)  Market  participants,  either  dealers  or  analysts,  could  figure  out  the  temporal 
structure of rates of return for not only short maturities but also longer ones, even 
reaching  a  span  of time  up  to 30  years;  besides,  they  were  able  to  adjust  the 
temporal  structure  by  the  so-called  yield  curve
4,  getting  access  to  a  powerful 
forecasting tool. 
 
b)  Grounded  on  the  temporal  structure  of  rates  of  return,  cash-flows  valuation 
became more precise and technical, by giving rise to risk-adjusted spot rates and 
                                                 
1 From institutional investors and big players to banks and corporations, even household units in 
pursuit of retirement schemes or educational expenses of children. 
2 A number of corporations and municipalities had issued zero-coupon bonds before the 80s. 
3 Sack (2000) makes for a good reference. 
4 For a deeper analysis in this issue, see Sack (2000) and Dybvig et al. (1996).   4 
by assimilating each cash flow to be discounted to a zero-coupon bond
5 . 
 
c)  The  development  of  this  technology  encouraged  financial  and  non-financial 
companies  to  issue  long-term  zero-coupon  bonds  to  meet  their  funding 
requirements.  The  new  market  provided  with  a  plentiful  source  of  liquidity  to 
qualified players and market-makers. 
 
It is for this paper to bring forward a non-standard convertible zero-coupon bond 
intended not only as a financing vehicle but also as a driver of better corporate 
governance. 
 
In section 1, we are going to delve into the nature of a simple zero-coupon bond. 
Section  2  will  outline  the  valuation  technique  of  such  bonds  profiting  from  the 
temporal  structure  of  rates  of  return.  Next,  section  3  will  focus  on  investment 
accounting,  while  section  4  is  going  to  deal  with  risks  involved  in  trading  zero-
coupons before they reach maturity date. Afterwards, section 5 will expand upon 
convertible zero-coupons and call provisions usually attached to them. Section 6 
will show forth the convertible zero-coupon bond which is the target of this paper. 
Lastly, section 7 will draw upon pragmatic consequences this security entails for 
corporate governance.  
   
 
1. THE NATURE OF A ZERO-COUPON BOND 
 
Let us assume that our decision-making involves an investment horizon  
 
H  =  [ [ [ [ t ; T] ] ] ]       
 
                                                 
5 Apreda (2009b, 2009c) handles this subject, providing new frameworks of analysis that includes a 
governance risk rate not only to discount cash-flows but also to appraise the cost-of-capital rate.  
   5 
where t is the starting date, when we intend to buy a security, and T is the end of 
the horizon, when either we sell the security or its maturity takes place eventually. 
As from now, we are going to deal with bonds purchased at t and held till maturity 




By a Zero-Coupon Bond
6 is meant a bond purchased at date t, with maturity 
at date T, such that the following constraints are met: 
 
·  V( ( ( (  t ) ) ) )   < < < <   V( ( ( (  T ) ) ) ), , , , 
·  there is no interest payment along the life of the bond, 
·  at maturity date, the bond pays off V( ( ( (        T ) ) ) ) only. 
 
As might be expected, this sort of discount bond comprises a simple cash position 
for the investor. In point of fact, its underlying cash-flow vector F becomes 
 
F  =  [ [ [ [ f( t ) ; f( T ) ] ] ] ]  =  [ [ [ [ − V( t ) ; V( T ) ] ] ] ]   
 
By the way, V(t) could refer to either the value at the issuing date or any other date 
when an investor makes up his mind to purchase it





For any financial asset, its return along the investment horizon can be figured out 
by means of the relationship 
 
                                                 
6 Henceforth, we are going to use ZC-bond for short. 
7 In this latter case, there are risks on the side of the seller as we are going to expand later on in 
section 4.   6 
(1) 
V( T )   +   I( t ; T )  -   V( t )  
    R( t ; T )  =    
V( t )   
 
 
where R(t;T) stands for total return expected to be earned throughout the horizon
8, 




When we deal with ZC-bonds, it holds true from definition 1 that  
 
I( t ; T )   =  0   
 
 
On that ground, the total return expected from a ZC-bond in (1) comes out like 
 
( 2 ) 
V( T )   -   V( t )  
    R( t ; T )  =             
V( t )   
 
Relationship (2) hints to the fact that when investing in ZC-bonds the only source of 
return stems from a change in value that accrues as time passes by.  
 
Singling out V(t), we get the valuation formula 
( 3 ) 
V( T )    
      V( t )  =       
[ [ [ [  1  +  R( t ; T )  ] ] ] ] 
 
 
Notice that V(t) in (3) arises out of discounting V(T) with the total holding return, 
from point to point in the horizon.  
                                                 
8 If valuation were done at date t, all values V(T), I(t; T), and R(t; T) need to be assessed as 
expected and contingent upon the analyst¢s information set W W W W(t) up to that moment.  
9  Calling  for  precision,  I(t;  T)  should  add  up  all  interest  inflows  along  the  horizon,  plus  the 
capitalization of each collection up to date T usually by means of risk-free assets.    7 
 
For  practical  purposes,  we  need  to  calibrate  R(t;  T)  so  that  other  investment 
alternatives might be easily contrasted with this one. 
  
In the first place, if the period unit were a semester, and there were exactly N 
semesters  within  the  horizon,  we  should  find  out  a  semester  rate  of  return 
equivalent to (2) by means of next relationship: 
 
[ [ [ [  1  +  R( t ; T )  ] ] ] ]   =   [ [ [ [  1  +  s( t ; N )  ¤¤¤¤  2  ] ] ] ]  
N 
 
which we plug into (3) to reach the standard valuation construct 
 
( 4 ) 
V( N )    
    V( t )     =        
[ [ [ [  1  +  s( t ; N )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ] 
N  
 
where s(t; N) stands for ²the nominal yearly rate of return that will yield the ZC-
bond from t = 0 (the purchasing date) till maturity date T = N, by compounding 
such  rate  semester  after  semester.² This  sort  of  rates  go  by  the name  of  spot 
rates and they come forth from the temporal structure of rates of return. In real 
practice, however, they are framed like risk-adjusted rates. A very sensible and 
widely used concoction is the following:  
(5) 
 
s adjusted (0; j)  /  2   =   s US-strips (0; j)  /  2   +   cr-rate  /  2   +   credr-rate  /  2 
 
where US-strips means the Treasury-Strip spot rate in a nominal and yearly basis, 
drawn out of the yield curve; cr-rate stands for ²country-risk rate, in a nominal and 
yearly basis²; credr-rate denotes ²credit-risk of the issuer, net of country-risk
10, in 
a  nominal  and  yearly  basis²,  the  three  of  them  to  be  compounded  through 
                                                 
10 In order to avoid double-keeping.   8 
semesters. We substitute (5) for the former spot rate in (4):  
(6) 
V( N )    
    V( t )     =        
[ [ [ [  1  +  s adjusted ( t ; N )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ] 
N  
 
In the second place, if the compounding-period unit were the semester but there 
would  not  be  exactly  N  semesters  within  the  horizon,  we  have  to  work  out  a 
relationship  like  (6)  to  cope  with  the  mismatching  of  semesters  into  the  whole 
horizon. The procedure is very simple indeed.  
 
Let us suppose that the number of days in the horizon amount to  
 
T  −  t     
 
days and we measure semesters as comprising 180 days each. The actual number 
of semesters will be equal to 
 
(T  −  t)  ¤¤¤¤  180     
 
Hence, and taking advantage of (6), the ultimate valuation follows:  
 
( 7 ) 
V( T )    
    V( t )  =  
 [ [ [ [  1  +  s adjusted ( t ; T )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ]  
(T  -  t)  ¤¤¤¤  180     
 
 
3.- INVESTMENT ACCOUNTING 
 
If the investor kept the ZC-bond till expiration date, he may be able to record the 
accrual of value in his financial statements, and realize the monetary inflow in the 
Income and Losses Statement. The whole valuation and recording of this accrual is 




Therefore, the investor would resort to (7) and register the earning of return as time 
passes by: 
 
[ [ [ [  1  +  s adjusted ( t ; T )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ]  




s adjusted ( t ; T ) 
 
is the yearly nominal rate of return, to be compounded by semesters, that suits to 
figuring out the accrual. In point of fact, sadjusted(t ; T) becomes the internal rate of 
return of the whole investment from date t = 0 till maturity date T = N
12. 
 
Last of all and profiting from investment accounting, buyers and holders of ZC-
bonds can amortize the difference between V(T) and V(t) as taxable income over 
the life of the bond.  
 
 
4.- RISKS OF TRADING BEFORE-MATURITY DATE 
 
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that an investor bought a ZC-bond at 
issuing date t, but later on he starts to suffer liquidity constraints and makes up his 
mind to sell the financial in the market at date t(1) so that 
 
t   〈 〈 〈 〈   t(1)   〈 〈 〈 〈   T 
 
                                                 
11 But if the investor did not keep the bond till maturity date and sells it before such date, he would 
face a winning or a losing outcome on account of the market discount rate in contrast with the value 
accrued up to that date. More background about this is given in section 4. 
12 In the technical appendix attached at the end of this paper the interested reader will find the 
accrual algorithm developed at length.    10
Within this setting, he must make a contrast between two values, the one that is 
given by his records from the investment accounting procedure, and the value the 
market  dealer  sets  at  t(1)  for  the  bidding  price.  Let  us  expand  on  this  matter 
further: 
 
·  Investment accounting valuation (iav): 
 
By compounding V(t) with the spot rate contractually settled at issuing date t = 0, 
we reach to 
 
V( t(1) , iav )   =   V( t ) ×  [ [ [ [  1  +  s adjusted ( t ; T )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ]  
( t(1)  −  t )  ¤¤¤¤  180 
 
 
·  Market valuation (mv): 
 
By discounting V(T) at t(1), we attain 
 
 
V( T ) 
 
       V( t(1) , mv )  =  
  
[ [ [ [  1  +  s adjusted ( t(1); T )  ¤¤¤¤  2 ] ] ] ]  
( T  −  t(1)  )  ¤¤¤¤  180 
 
The investor compares then the difference between these values, by followint next 
rule: 
 
a)  if        V( t(1) , iav )     〈 〈 〈 〈     V( t(1) , mv ) 
 
then he reaps a benefit from the transaction. 
 
b)  if        V( t(1) , iav )     〉 〉 〉 〉     V( t(1) , mv ) 
 
then he incurs a loss from trade. 
 
As from date t(1), the new investor should make the investment accounting with 
the rate sadjusted (t(1); T)  ¤¤¤¤ 2,  which gives the holding return till expiration date   11
arising from the new acquisition price. 
 
 
5.- CONVERTIBLE ZERO-COUPON BONDS 
 
Broadly  speaking,  zero-coupon  bonds  can  be  designed  and  offered  with  a 
conversion  feature,  by  which  investors  may  exchange  them  for  ordinary  stock. 




By a convertible zero-coupon is meant a financial combo consisting of 
 
·  a zero-coupon bond, 
·  a  conversion  feature  which  establishes  that,  under  contractual 
conditions, the bond will be convertible in ordinary shares, preferred 
shares, or other bonds. 
 
By  and  large,  convertible  bonds  allow  investors  the  contingent  choice  of 
exchanging the bond for other securities from the same company, mainly ordinary 
shares. It is a contingent choice since conversion takes place under a well-defined 
set  of  conditional  future  states  of  the  world  already  settled  in  the  issuance 
prospect. 
 
In the most frequent scenario, conversion triggers off when the stock price in the 
market  is  higher  than  its  contractual  exercise  price.  That  is,  the  standard 
conversion follows since a convertible bond is a financial combo that comprises a 
simple bond plus an embedded option which gives each investor the right to buy 
shares from the bond’s issuer. Valuation of such combo must take into account its 
dual nature. A remarkable contribution to standard convertibles valuation can be 
found in Brennan and Schwartz (1980).    12
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the convertible developed in this paper is 
non-standard, since it does not involve a call option, as we are going to show later 
in section 6.   
 
The  above-mentioned  exercise  price  stems  from  a  contractual  device  called 
²conversion  rate²,  denoted  (CR),  which  itemizes  the  number  of  shares  to  be 
exchanged for the nominal value of the bond¢s trading unit
13. 
 
There is a variegated assortment of customized convertibles and most of them 
include calls provisions. By this covenant, the issuing company can perform the 
call provision at any time after certain contractual date. Either issuers of coupon-
bearing bonds or zero-coupon ones resort most of the time to this covenant which, 
as Narayanan and Lin (1989) argued, still adding the fact that with a corporate rate 
tax less than 50%, they are not optimal. Both authors found evidence that zero-
coupon bonds with call provisions have more restrictive financing covenants than 
those without call provisions.  
 
The  rationale  behind  a  call  provision  lies  on  refunding,  by  which  the  company 
would be able to redeem the ZC-bond by issuing another bond with lower internal 
rate of return. Unlike what happens with coupon-bearing bonds, a callable ZC-bond 
sets a fixed price and not a time-dependent price, an example of which will be 
given below. 
  
Thus, and for the sake of illustration, let us consider the convertible ZC-debenture 
that Corning Inc. issued up to 2,7 billion dollars in November 8, 2000, with maturity 
date 15 years thereafter. Chan, J. and Bruner, R. F. (2001) have extensively dealt 
with this bond, which carried along three embedded options: 
 
                                                 
13 For instance, if the nominal value for each issued unit of the bond were 1,000 dollars, and the 
conversion rate came defined as 1:10, the exercise price of each unit of stock would amount to 100 
dollars.   13
·  The right to convert the bond to common stock (in fact, an American option 
that could be exercised since the issuance date). 
·  A redemption option (anytime from November 8, 2005) that amounted for 
the company to be long a call, and the investor to be short a call. 
·  A pair of put options on behalf of the investor, to be exercised on November 
8, 2005, and November 8, 2010. 
 
 
6.- DEVISING A NON-STANDARD CONVERTIBLE ZERO-COUPON BOND 
 
At departure from the conventional batch of callable and convertible bonds, this 
paper sets forth a tailor-made design which requires a closer examination of its 
non-standard  nature.  As  a  starting  point,  two  features  are  worthy  of  being 
remarked:  
 
·  This bond intends not only to finance any company, but also to enhance its 
corporate governance. 
·  The  security  can  be  offered  either  by  means  of  a  public  or  a  private 
placement. Empirical evidence witnesses the fact that for most countries in 
the world, private placements are absolutely favored against public ones. 
On  this  point,  we  refer  the  reader  to  Carey  et  al.  (1993)  as  well  as  to 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1996). 
 
a)  Conversion takes place at maturity date only 
 
Here we have a feature that stands out in stark contrast with many convertible 
bonds, most of them coupon-bearing whose conversion may be exercised, or not, 
over a contractually well-defined period. 
 
Accordingly,  investors  who  bought  this  non-standard  ZC-bond  would  know  for 
certain that there will be only a distinctive date for the undertaking of conversion,   14
irrespective of how well or badly the share price had performed before that date. 
 
If the ZC-bond were held through expiration date, the investor would grant himself 
the accrual in his books of the whole amount gained under the guise of holding 
return. Otherwise, if conversion took place prior to maturity, as usually happens 
with standard convertibles, he could only claim the return accrual till exercise date 
only. 
   
b) Conversion is mandatory at maturity date 
 
Usually, holders of convertible bonds give heed to an exercise period over which 
conversion  might  be  claimed.  If  over  the  full  span  of  the  exercise  period, 
conversion were not convenient, those investors would be entitled to collect V(T) at 
expiration date, that is to say, they cash the bond principal at maturity date. 
  
In contradistinction to this standard procedure, investors who buy the ZC-bond we 
are  dealing  with  must  exchange  the  bond  for  ordinary  shares  at  maturity  date 
which means they forfeit the principal redemption of V(T) in cash.  
 
To  put  it  differently,  this  bond  entails  an  uncommon  attribute  that  makes  a 
difference with other types of convertibles: there is no embedded call-option in this 
financial. The investor, when purchasing the convertible, does not acquire any right 
to buy the company’s stock but he must swap the bond for stock 
 
c) Conversion brings about a well-determined pay-off function 
 
Let us assume that for each issued unit of the bond, with nominal par value V(N), 
the contract established a conversion rate equal to W ordinary shares from the 
company: 
CR  =  1 : W 
   15
In other words, 
 
V(N)   =    W  ×  S exercise price (N) 
 
At maturity date, when the market value of each ordinary share counts up to S(N),  





·  Decision-making for setting 1 
 
If     V(N)    =    W  ×  S exercise price (N)    〉 〉 〉 〉     W  ×  S(N) 
 
then the investor receives the following combo: 
 
W units of newly issued ordinary shares 
 
Cash for the difference  V(N)  −  W  ×  S(N) 
 
Therefore, the investor is compensated in cash up to the conversion value.  
 
·  Decision-making for setting 2 
 
If     V(N)   =    W  ×  S exercise price (N)     〈 〈 〈 〈     W  ×  S(N) 
 
then the investor receives W units of newly issued ordinary shares and reaps 
the market-price gap over the exercise price
15:. 
                                                 
14  Here  we  assume  an  expiration  date  T=  N.  That  is  to  say,  in  the  horizon  there  exactly  N 
semesters. If this were not the case, relationship (7) would hence ensue and we should denote the 
par value as V(T) instead. 
15 More precisely, and in monetary value: 
Pay Off (setting 1) =  W × Sexercise price (N) +  [ [ [ [Sexercise price (N) − Smarket (N) ] ] ] ] × W  =  W × Sexercise price (N)         16
Remarks:  
·  The mechanism of conversion avoids the company to keep and add money 
at the end of regular periods so as to ultimately build up the amount it will 
need to pay off the principal to bondholders at maturity date. Therefore, and 




·  For valuation purposes, this bond ²redeems² the principal value V(T) either 
as stock or cash-stock mix. That is to say, what the bond promised when it 
was issued at date t, it delivers at expiration date eventually. 
 
d) There are no Call Provisions whatsoever 
 
This contractual rule sends out an unmistakably signal to markets. In point of fact, 
the  covenant  seeks  to  protect  the  bondholders’  property  rights  in  case  the 
company were weighing up an early redemption of the bond on the grounds of 
future reorganization, merger or acquisition.   
 
Putting  it  in  other  words,  no  early  redemption  will  be  allowed  regardless  of 
impending changes in the organization. Otherwise, bondholders would be able to 
trigger off the default claim which lies on this sort of covenants. 
 
e) Track Record Statement  
 
We regard this covenant as a key driver for shaping up the company’s corporate 
governance.  Period  after  period,  the  company  must  attach  to  its  Financial 
Statements an externally audited Track Record Statement rendering the following 
                                                                                                                                                     
Pay Off ( setting 2 )  =  W × Sexercise price (N) 
The difference lies on setting 1 which delivers a mix of cash and stock.       
16 More background on sinking funds and their consequences for Corporate Governance, can be 
found in Apreda (2007).   17
variables of analysis in full detail: 
 
·  Stock price performance in the period. In case of a private placement, a 
technical value performance. 
·  The  outstanding  amount  of  the  convertible  zero-coupon  bond  held  by 
creditors, with an account of any repurchase carried out through the period, 
either by means of open-market transactions or private agreements. 
·  Capital structure of the company, displaying varieties of stock issued and its 
voting differential rights. 
·  Credit-risk rating must be enforceable and duly reported. 
·  A complete review of all standing bonds and bank loans, either publicly or 
privately held. 
·  Dividends policy from five years prior to the issuance of the convertible zero-
coupon bond up to the statement date. 
 
Summing up this section, the bond becomes operational in that it goes straight for 
its  goal  of  raising  finance  at  date  t,  and  making  the  conversion  attainable  at 
maturity  date  T,  by  means  of  the  above-described  rules  of  design  that  must 
become, to all intents and purposes, embedded covenants in the bond indenture, 
within the framework of fiduciary duties towards creditors
17.  
 
6.1 COUNTERVAILING FORCES IN THE ZC-BOND DESIGN 
 
Looking over the covenants developed out of section 6, we realize that some of 
them play countervailing roles to balance not only sensible constraints set upon the 
issuer but also relative levels of freedom on behalf of investors. 
 
i)  As conversion takes place at maturity date only, and it is also mandatory, 
the investor knows for certain that the income to be accrued will evolve 
                                                 
17 By fiduciary duties, we wish to highlight here at least three of them: trust, diligence and good faith. 
On this subject, see Black (2001), Flannigan (2004), Easterbrook and Fischel (1996).   18
and  will  be  recorded  in  his  books  period  after  period,  which  helps 
financial income being assessed ahead of time. 
 
On the other hand, covenants a) and b) prevent the company from disbursing cash 
flows  or  delivering  new  shares  to  investors  prior  expiration  date.  By  the  same 
token,  covenant  d)  means  that  the  company  had  forfeited  its  rights  to  any  call 
provisions at all.  
 
ii)  If the company¢s stock underperformed in the market, widening the gap 
settled in the indenture by the exercise price, the less the market price 
becomes, the more cash the investor would collect as follows from the 
pay-off function
18 in covenant c). Besides, investors are able to follow up 
the company¢ performance through the Track Record Statement. 
 
Therefore, the company faces here an incentive to perform better and cut down 
some common agency problems usually arising in other sort of debt commitments. 
 
  
7.- PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
So far we have considered the financial engineering pertaining to the convertible 




Broadly  speaking,  Corporate  Governance  refers  to  the  field  of  knowledge  and 
                                                 
18 The convertible may fall out of favor among investors, leading to massive sales orders and the 
plunging of the bond value, which should increase the company’s liabilities in cash, as the gap 
between the market price and the exercise price widens. 
19 Incidentally, that Corporate Governance is one side of the coin, while Corporate Finance is its 
other side, was firstly noticed by Oliver Williamson (1983).   19
practice whose main concerns are
20: 
 
·  The founding charter of the organization and its ownership structure 
·  Fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors and their control rights 
·  Fiduciary duties of the management and their decision rights 
·  Covenants on behalf of creditors 
·  Conflicts  of  interests  among  shareholders,  Directors,  managers,  creditors 
and other stakeholders 
·  Accountability and compliance risks 
·  Transparency 
·  Compensation packages for the management and Board 
 
The zero-coupon bond set forth in this paper handles the following governance 
variables: 
 
a)  ownership structure, 
b)  covenants on behalf of creditors, 
c)  accountability and compliance risks,  
d)  transparency, 
e)  compensation packages. 
 
Let us delve further upon these issues. 
 
a)  ownership structure 
 
Compulsory conversion opens the door to new shareholders. In many countries, 
for a company to issue convertibles it is required that the ownership structure be 
                                                 
20 More background on this subject can be found in the paper The Semantics of Governance, by 
Apreda (2006a), who called each component in the definition, the basic variables of analysis in 
Corporate Governance.     20
changed to that of a corporation, and the placement procedure be a public offer
21.  
 
Besides, when bondholders get access to the new stock, the ownership structure 
bears changes in important issues like the shaping of majorities, differential voting 
rights, Board composition, dilution and preference rights, standing compensation 
plans related to stock, as well as minorities’ rights.  
 
In continental Europe, as well as in Latin American countries, most companies are 
family-owned and closed, with a strong cultural and institutional bias against public 
placements in domestic Stock Exchanges
22. Prevented the owners from issuing 
convertibles  by  current  regulations,  the  only  sensible  way  would  be  a  private 
placement among older stockholders
23 or institutional investors alike.  
 
b) covenants on behalf of creditors 
 
In this sort of ZC-bond, there are three features that are worthy of being remarked. 
 
·  Firstly, the company has no right to call the bond before maturity. 
·  Secondly, the bond has a compulsory conversion at maturity date, which 
means  that  creditors  will  be  given  new  stock,  or  new  stock  plus  the 
                                                 
21  In  Argentina,  the  regulation  constrains  the  issuance  of  bonds  to  corporations  (limited  public 
companies), foundations and cooperatives, but for convertible bonds only corporations are allowed 
to issue them, and its public placement becomes compulsory. 
22 For the sake of illustration, in Argentina there are almost 100 listed companies. The best time for 
listing took place in the 60s, when almost 560 companies were listed (see Apreda, 2009, 2001). 
Australia, in contrast, with less population than Argentina it has more than 2,500 companies listed, 
pointing  to  another  institutional  framework  and  culture,  as  a  matter  of  course.  A  remarkable 
comparative analysis focused on OECD members can be found in Roe (2003). 
23 This would bring about, of necessity, a change in the Shareholders Agreement, since manifold 
problems ought to be taken into account, like succession issues, and new generations entering the 
Board. We refer the reader to the book Codes of Good Governance Around the World (2009a), 
edited by Professor Lopez Iturriaga, Nova Science Publishers, New York, for detailed information 
upon this matter; in particular the Argentina case is developed by Apreda in chapter 2, pp. 35-54.    21
difference between the exercise price and the market price. 
·  Lastly, the company must fulfill all the requirements of the Track Record 
Statement. 
 
c) accountability and compliance risks  
 
Accountability deals with making commitments and be held responsible for their 
compliance  (Apreda,  2009a,  2006a).  This  notion  of  paramount  importance  in 
Corporate  Governance,  has  been  further  qualified  in  the  literature  with  the 
introduction, by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010, 2005),  
of the compliance function whose goal is to cope with compliance risks. Whereas 
the compliance function was intended for financial institutions around the world, an 
expansion of it to non-financial institutions can be found in Apreda (2006b). 
 
To  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  Track  Record  Statement  plays  the  role  of  a 




Following  the  benchmark  provided  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision  (BIS,  2010,  1998),  information  should  be  regarded  as  transparent 
when it is comprehensive, timely, relevant, comparable, reliable and material
24.  
 
If we looked back to our convertible zero-coupon bond, three points would stand 
out: 
·  As a bond, it is a liability that must be disclosed in the Financial Statements. 
On the other hand, as a zero-coupon bond, there are no cash outlays since 
it does not pay any interest over the whole life of the bond.  
                                                 
24  According  to  the  Basel  Committee  (1998),  information  must  be  regarded  as  material  “if  its 
omission or misstatement could change or influence the assessment or decision of a user relying on 
that information.”   22
·  The  bond  indenture  must  contain  the  conversion  feature  as  well  as  a 
detailed description of the pay-off function at expiration date.  
·  The Track Record Statement is fully enforceable.  
 
Therefore,  for  market  analysts  would  become  an  easier  task  following  up  how 
things are going on with this sort of bond, and also to assess the current and the 
future capital structure of the firm. 
 
e) compensation packages 
 
The  convertible  ZC-bond  we  are  discussing  would  successfully  meet  basic 
requirements for transparency and accountability if the company resorted to this 
financial  to  devise  compensation  packages  for  executives  and directors.  Let  us 
delve  into  how  this  bond  can  qualify  as  a  component  of  certain  compensation 
package. 
 
￿  Maturity  
Agency  problems  are  topical  among  stockholders,  managers,  and  Directors. 
Therefore, it seems advisable to cope with such conflicts of interest (mainly short-
termism,  rent-seeking,  and  soft  budget  constraints
25)  by  setting  a  long-term 
expiration date around 10 years. Besides, a covenant should be included in the 
package contract to forbid any further change in the exercise price or the expiration 
date
26.   
 
￿  Investment accounting 
On behalf of managers and directors, the accrual of the bond’s returns takes place 
as  time  passes  by.  To  accomplish  such  goal,  the  company  will  run  individual 
accounts for each beneficiary, but cash flows will not be delivered to them until 
                                                 
25 For a thorough treatment of these matters, the reader is referred to Apreda (2005, 2002b).  
26 Such deviant behavior became standard practice in many companies, some of them involved with 
the wave of scandals in the aftermath of Enron¢s demise (more about Enron in Apreda, 2002).   23
maturity. That is to say, at expiration date they receive the whole of returns 
 
V(T) – V(t) 
 
in cash, plus the shares endowed through the conversion ratio. 
  
￿  The conversion feature 
One thing is to issue this bond for investors who agree to finance an investment 
project, and quite another thing to make use of it as a compensation device.  
In the former case, there is (as we saw in section 6c) a pay-off function that pulls 
the trigger at expiration date, delivering stock only, or a composite consisting of 
shares plus the balance in cash when the stock price had fallen below the exercise 
price.  
 
But for executives and directors, the conversion feature must consist only of full 
delivery of shares. The rationale for this choice can be outlined this way: 
i.  compensation packages intend to reward good performance; 
 
ii.  when  performance  comes  below  expectations  or  settled  targets, 
managers and directors must be held accountable for that, and share 
the downside with stockholders.  
 
￿  Tenure 
This is a thorny contractual matter and we are going to focus on two unavoidable 
contingencies to cope with. 
 
i.  If maturity took place while the executive is in his tenure, then he 
should receive shares plus the accrued return from the bond. This 
follows regardless the company had decided, before expiration date, 
to build up and grant to the executive a new convertible bond as a 
subsequent compensation package.      24
 
ii.  If tenure ended before the maturity date, there are some alternative 
ways to deal with such scenario. For the sake of illustration, we point 
to a pair of likely contractual settings: 
 
o  The executive leaves the company in good terms. He could 
claim shares plus the accrued returns up to that moment, or 
hold his rights till maturity date, albeit tenure had expired. 
 
o  The executive leaves the company in bad terms. If such were 
the case, the company should deliver the accrued returns only, 





A  convertible  zero-coupon  like  the  one  brought  forth  in  this  research  paper  is 
advisable and feasible for financial and non-financial companies, on the grounds of 
two advantage points: 
 
a)  It is a financing vehicle for new investment projects for those investors who 
are not only interested in becoming bondholders but also shareholders of 
the issuing company. However and at variance from conventional coupon-
bearing  convertible  bonds,  investors  only  get  the  accrual  of  the  holding 
return,  year  after  year,  since  they  are  not  entitled  to  getting  back  the 
principal. Lastly, this bond does not return the principal, because there is no 
call option embedded, while exchange for stock is compulsory. 
 
b)   Alternatively, it offers a transparent and reliable compensation tool for the 
Management  and  the  Board  of  Directors,  which  diminishes  agency 
problems, and it is conditional upon a distinguished tenure. 
   25
The technical improvements that such convertible bears to notice fall under the 
following headings: 
 
￿  conversion takes place at maturity date only,  
￿  conversion is mandatory at maturity date, 
￿  conversion offers investors a compulsory pay-off function at maturity date, 
￿  call provisions are ruled out before expiration date, 
￿  a Track Record Statement must be enforced and released.  
 
Corporate  governance  is  streamlined  with  this  convertible  zero-coupon  bond, 
mainly  through  ownership  structure  changes,  covenants  set  up  on  behalf  of 
creditors, accountability as well as transparency practices, compliance risks and, 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Let us delve into the algorithm underlying the investment accounting process. 
 
Stage 1: How does V(0) growth 
 
At date t = 0, the ZC-Bond values 
 
V(N) 
V(0)   =     
( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N 
 
at date t = 1,  
V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1 
 
at date t = 2, 
V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
2 
 
at date t = j, 
V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j 
 
and,,lastly, at date t = N = T, 
 
V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N   =  V(N)  =  V(T) 
 
Remark:  If [ [ [ [t; T] ] ] ] did not exactly comprise N periods, then slight changes would ensue by 
means of relationship (7), in section 2. 
 
Stage 2: How does the holding return accrue period after period 
Let us denote as HR(j − 1, j) the holding return from date t = j − 1 through t = j. 
 
At date t = 1,    29
HR(0, 1)  = 
 
=  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1  −  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
0    
 
=  V(0)  × [ ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1  −  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
0 ]    
 
=   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2 )    
 
at date t = 2, 
HR(1, 2)  = 
 
=  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
2  −  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1    
 
=  V(0)  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1 ×  [ ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1  −  1 ]    
 
=   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1     
 
at date t = j, 
HR(j − 1, j) = 
 
=  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j  −  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j - 1    
 
=  V(0)  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j - 1 ×  [ ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1  −  1 ]    
 
=   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j - 1     
 
and,,lastly, at date t = N = T, 
 
V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N  −  V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N - 1    
 
=  V(0)  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N - 1 ×  [ ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
1  −  1 ]    
 
=   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N - 1     
   30
Stage 3: How does the total holding return accrue at the end of the day?  
 
We must solve  
 
HR(0, N)   =   S   HR(j − 1, j)          j: 1, 2, 3, …….. , N 
 
which amounts to 
 
HR(0, N)   =   S   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  × ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j - 1     
 
that is to say: 
 
HR(0, N)   =      V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  ×  [ [ [ [  S   ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
j - 1  ] ] ] ]   
 
or, equivalently,  
 
HR(0, N)   =   V(0)  ×  s(0,N) / 2  × {  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N   −  1 } /  { s(0,N) / 2 } 
 
HR(0, N)   =      V(0)  ×  {  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N   −  1 }  
 
HR(0, N)   =      V(0)  ×  ( 1 + s(0,N) / 2 ) 
N   −  V(0)  
 
Hence, 
HR(0, N)   =   V(N)  
  −   V(0)  
 
As we said in section 3, buyers that hold ZC-bonds till maturity are able to amortize the 
difference between V(T) and V(t) like taxable income over the whole life of the bond. 